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Abstract
Public trust in governmental institutions is essential for maintaining democracies and
legitimacy. Without public trust to support them, courts remain vulnerable to executive and
legislative attempts to curb their behavior and risk non-compliance to their decisions. While
courts in the United States enjoy relatively high levels of public confidence, courts in Latin
American countries generally do not. This study aims to determine the level of trust in Latin
American judiciaries and identify the factors that impact public trust in Latin American high
courts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public trust is essential for the stability of democracy. Levi (1998) and Kroknes (2013)
argue that citizens are more likely to comply with norms if they perceive the government as
credible. Thus, to produce and achieve political outcomes, trust must be present. “High political
trust signals that the institutions function properly and effectively, and helps to keep democracy
alive” (Listhaug and Ringdal 2008). Easton (1965) and Driscoll (2018) agree that political
institutions need the public’s trust to be operative. They argue that understanding trust is vital in
every society, and courts should treat people with respect and fairness. If there are low levels of
political trust, it weakens government effectiveness and legitimacy. For instance, Kalenhalter
(2013) finds that reduced trust in institutions and governance systems may damage the
government system’s foundations. Norris (1999) mentions that if there is no political confidence,
it could threaten the government’s legitimacy and the chance that citizens undermine the
government’s authority increases.
Easton (1965, 1975) explains that there are two dimensions of support: specific support
and diffuse support. Specific support is what the authorities do and how they do it. It refers to
people’s satisfaction with perceived outcomes and performance of political authorities. Specific
support, in other words, is defined as containing two elements: it is directed toward political
authorities and is an evaluation of the performance of those authorities (Buhlmann and Kunz
2011; Gibson and Caldeira 2009).
Diffuse support refers to what a political object means or represents for the members of
the system, and not to what the object does. Easton (1965) defines diffuse support as “the
reservoir of favorable attitudes and good will that would help members to accept and tolerate
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outputs that are damaging to their wants” (273). Diffuse support, then, is related to generalized
attitudes and attachments to the objects of the political system. Miller and Listhaug (1990) refer
to diffuse support as the belief that a political system or institution will deliver based on an
expectation of the citizens’ demands, which means that people’s perceptions and opinions about
government performance reflect their evaluations of specific personalities, institutions, and
policies. Diffuse support is achieved over time through consistent positive court output and
commitment to democratic values. There are two components to diffuse support: trust and
legitimacy (Buhlmann and Kunz 2011; Easton 1965, 1975; Gibson and Caldeira 2009). Their
relationship can be self-reinforcing where increased levels of trust between citizens and the
judicial system, leading to increased legitimacy (Tyler and Huo 2002).
Many scholars agree that the public’s diffuse support is of unique importance for courts
because these institutions cannot directly enforce their decisions. If courts lack institutional
legitimacy, then “courts do not have enough leeway to decide against public opinion where
necessary,” such a protecting political minorities (Bühlmann and Kunz 2011). The lack of public
support for the judiciary creates strategic conditions that facilitate political attacks against courts
(Castagnola and Perez-Linan 2011). For example, in Venezuela there was a court-packing law
signed by Chavez in 2004, gave the governing coalition the power to remove judges from the
court without the two-thirds majority vote required under the constitution, thereby undermining
the country's democracy. Since then, the judicial institution has deteriorated, but conditions have
grown sharply worse in recent years due to a concentration of power in the executive and harsher
crackdowns on the opposition. These attacks on courts render them unable to constrain executive
and legislative institutions to maintain democratic processes effectively.

2

Indeed, Latin American courts typically have low trust despite the fact that the
constitutions of every Latin American country guarantee the autonomy of the judiciaries. Low
public trust may be due to issues where “these provisions are not always applied in practice due
to several reasons, such as power-grabbing by the executive, the constant interference of political
interest groups or pressure from public opinion in certain matters” (Donoso 2006, 277). Several
authors have sought to explain the causes of trust by relating it to judicial performance. Salzman
and Ramsey (2013, 76) demonstrate that there are countries where courts do not “largely perform
as intended,” where Latin American countries have a particular problem in providing goods and
order. Oko (2009, 190) contends that the areas of most considerable significance to public
dissatisfaction in Latin America are “(1) corruption, which represents a major challenge to the
performance of political institutions. As such, (2) human rights abuses; these features,
particularly in terms of corruption and human rights abuses, remain prominent in some countries
and (3) the government’s lack of sensitivity to the needs and welfare of its citizens.” Thus, if the
authorities are not capable of responding to the challenges of an economic crisis this may
undermine citizen’s trust. For years, some Latin American countries has been in an economic
crisis and the frustration amongst the citizens is rising, including Venezuela.
Beyond, judicial independence and performance, the current research on political trust
has identified several factors that influence confidence in political institutions in general.
Scholars typically tend to emphasize how various political and economic indicators—increased
corruption, poor institutional legitimacy, low national wealth, and socioeconomic inequality—
are negatively associated with political trust (Alesina et al. 2003; Boateng 2016; Karakoç 2013;
Keefer and Knack 2000; Segovia 2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015). For example, a common
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finding within the political context illustrates how corruption reduces citizens’ trust in political
institutions (Newton 2007).
Beyond national level conditions, individual characteristics can also impact a person’s
level of trust in their governmental institutions. In order to achieve favorable evaluation from the
citizens the courts must treat everyone in a similar manner irrespective of race, socioeconomic
status, and gender because it may affect their confidence levels in all institutions if they were
treated differently. Also, when citizens perceive and experience corruption with government
authorities, they lose confidence in the political system because they operate under the belief that
bribery supersedes the law (Lavallé et al. 2008).
There has been a large of comparative research on explaining the factors of trust at the
individual level and some focusing only at the national level. Yet, the factors that most determine
public trust in Latin American judiciaries remain underspecified. In this research, I build upon
national and individual level models by synthesizing them into a multilevel model. This model
helps us have a complete understanding of the support for courts, particularly in Latin American
nations where political instability and executive overreach have been recurring problems. This
paper thus contributes to our knowledge of what limits or enables public support for courts,
particularly in Latin American nations where political instability and executive overreach have
been recurring problems.
This thesis is organized such that Chapter 2 presents the theory, methodology, and
analysis of national-level factors that impact public trust in Latin American courts. Chapter 3
offers an analysis of individual-level factors on trust on courts in Latin America, and Chapter 4
offers a hierarchical model to better evaluate the fully-specified model that combines the
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previous individual-level and national-level factors. Chapter 5 summarizes the main results and
offers some concluding remarks and policy implications for Latin American courts.
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Chapter 2
How National Factors Impact Trust in Latin American Courts
The national political, social, and economic environment can directly impact citizen trust
in governmental institutions, including trust in the nation’s courts. Because public trust is largely
derived from the alignment of citizen expectations and government performance, government
performance is critical to developing public trust. A key factor that indicates good government
performance is national wealth or economic development, where poor economic conditions are
typically assumed to be due to poor governance. Other key factors are political institutions and
features can impact trust as well, such as regime type, judicial independence, education, and
corruption. These features directly impact citizen expectations and the ability of these institutions
to fulfill their obligations effectively. As such, this chapter examines these national level factors
that can impact trust in Latin American courts.
2.1 Theory
Judicial Independence
There has been a host of research that highlight the importance of judicial independence
and its crucial impact on public confidence. (Buhlmann and Kunz 2011; Djink Vos 2018; Easton
1965, 1975; Gibson and Caldeira 2009). Judicial independence refers to the extent that courts
and judicial actors are insulated from external political pressures. As such, judicial independence
allows for court impartiality. That is, judicial independence as insulation from pressure from
external sources ensures that judicial decisions are not influenced by political interests so that
decisions are based only upon the law.
There are two types of judicial independence: de jure and de facto judicial independence.
De jure judicial independence refers to institutional features that could allow for or reduce the
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influence of non-judicial actors on judicial processes. For example, de jure independence
includes the scope of jurisdiction, constitutional or statutory powers, the rules on impeachment
or removal, the appointment process, the size of the court, tenure stability and budgetary
autonomy (Taylor 2014). These institutional features and processes are often codified into
statutes or constitutions to ensure this protection from outside interests, such as through the
appointment of judges based upon professional qualification and not according to party
preferences (Buhlmann and Kunz 2011; Feld and Voigt 2003), lack of institutional mechanisms
that could be used to manipulate the court by actors with an interest in the output of a given
process, (Buhlmann and Kunz 2011), and separating the judiciary from the other branches of the
government. These institutional reduces the ability of external actors to impact or manipulate
court decisions.
De facto judicial independence refers to influences that could impact the court beyond
direct institutional mechanism, such as threats of retaliation, judge career options upon leaving
the bench, public support for courts or decisions, divided government and electoral turnover, the
possibility for clear oversight of decisions, the public legitimacy of courts, the potential of
interference to affect other cases on the docket, the likelihood of non-compliance, and shocks in
the policy domain (Taylor 2014).
Many scholars would agree that both types of judicial independence are essential for the
proper functioning of courts. Citizens lose trust in judicial systems when it is not doing the
expected job fairly, impartially, quickly, and comprehensively. This loss of trust has significant
consequences, where courts that lack the public trust and support are more vulnerable to attempts
by political actors to undermine judicial independence, checks and balances, and the rule of law
(Arato 2016). Thus, the judiciary’s strength and the stability of democracy itself depend on the
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individuals’ confidence in the judicial system. Judicial independence enables courts to make
impartial, rule-based law, which allows courts to function effectively and in alignment with
citizen expectations of appropriate judicial roles. Thus, judicial independence is expected to
improve public trust, as summarized in the hypothesis below.
H1: The higher the degree of judicial independence in a given country, the more likely
national courts enjoy public trust.
Democracy
Increased experiences of democratic transition have sought to produce stable and
consolidated democratic regimes. Democracies have important institutional features that directly
link with public trust (Linz and Stepan 1996; Shin 2007). People have higher levels of trust in
democracies than in other regime types because democracies fundamentally provide for
mechanisms through which citizens can directly and indirectly contribute to the functions and
goals of the governing regime. Democratic mechanisms—like electoral voting, lobbying,
protesting, and organizing—facilitate the alignment of citizen goals and priorities with that of the
government. Whenever political elites or regimes deviate too far from citizen interests, citizens
have mechanisms to either pressure their re-alignment or remove incumbents in favor of elites
who commit to citizen interests. This alignment and influence of citizens in the governing
process increases public trust in political institutions generally, including the courts. For
example, Boateng (2020) finds that countries that enjoy greater democracy also enjoy greater
levels of public confidence in their respective judicial systems. Hence, I evaluate the following
hypothesis:
H2: Higher levels of democracy within a given country will lead to higher levels of public
trust in courts.
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Education Level
There has been a large of research studies on linking education level and public trust.
More educated citizens are associated with higher levels of trust relative to citizenry with lower
levels of education since more education allows for greater understanding and participation in
politics and political institutions. Yet, the effects of education may also depend upon the regime
type and presence of corruption. For instance, Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) show that trust
and education are positively correlated in non-corrupt countries and negatively correlated in
corrupt countries. By adding this variable will help to understand how the interaction between
education, trust, corruption as the level of democracy in a country change. This means that
citizens will express high or low trust based on their evaluation of the performance of political
actors and institutions from this reasoning, the following hypothesis can be deducted:
H3: Countries with citizens obtaining higher levels of education will experience higher
levels of trust in courts.
Corruption
Corruption has increased in Latin America and has been considered a serious problem
that hinders the government performances and reduces public trust (Weyland 1989; Seligson
2001). While earlier research on corruption argued that it was necessary or functional the
maintenance of a political system (Huntington 1968), most recent scholarship finds that
corruption is negatively associated with public trust. Boateng (2015) finds that low corruption
levels are related to high levels of generalized trust, and Seligson (2002) and Urribarri (2011)
find that corruption negatively influences generalized trust. Della Porta (2000) explains that
corruption reduces trust in a regime’s ability to respond to citizens’ concerns, where corruption is
a destructive force that undermines institutional quality and performance. In other words,
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corruption reduces institutional effectiveness and removes government alignment with citizen
interests and expectations. This misalignment and reduction of effectiveness and quality causes
citizens to reduce their trust in political institutions generally, including the courts. Hence,
H4: Higher levels of corruption within a given country reduces public trust in courts.
Economic development
Trust is also a function of the economic performance of governments. Holmber (1997)
shows that economic conditions are important in explaining trends of trust in government in
Sweden, and Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) show that confidence in government is negatively
related to unemployment in Western Europe (see also Lipset and Schneider 1987; Bok 1997;
Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000; Newton 2006). Other research similarly shows that, at least in
developed democracies, levels of trust are higher among those respondents that consider that the
economy is doing well, either for the society or their own pockets (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton
2000; Orren 1997; Levi 1998; Lipset and Schneider 1987; Segovia 2008). Citizen financial
satisfaction is significantly and positively related to trust as well (Kelly 2003; Espinal et al.
2006). Economic conditions serve as a proxy to citizens to evaluate how well the governing
regime and institutions are performing.
For this reason, better economic conditions make people more supportive of the
government generally, and more trusting. Alternatively, poor economic conditions may
undermine public support for the government because it reflects government inefficiency,
mismanagement, and/or poor ability to govern. As part of the political regime, courts are
expected to experience the same effects as these governing institutions generally.
I thus include the following hypothesis:
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H5: Increases in GDP per capita within a given country leads to higher levels of public
trust in courts.
I also include unemployment rate as an indicator of economic conditions, because several
researchers find that increased unemployment correlates with reduced political trust (Buhlmann
and Kunz 2011; Earle 2009; Midthjell 2010; Roth et al. 2011). Research on the effects of
increased unemployment also finds that in many countries, where unemployment levels have
increased, experience reduced trust in politicians, political parties, and political institutions
(Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). From this it is possible to assume that in countries where the
unemployment rate is high, levels of political trust are low. because citizen are dissatisfied with
government’s capability to manage the national economy and respond to economic crisis. Hence,
I examine the following hypothesis:
H6: Lower levels of unemployment leads to increased public trust in courts.
2.2 Methods
I utilize the latest data available from the University of Gothenburg's Quality of
Government (2021) and Linzer and Staton’s (2015) judicial independence dataset to examine the
influence of national level indicators on trust in the Latin American court systems. Specifically, I
use this data to analyze Latin American countries Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Dependent Variable
My dependent variable is confidence in courts of law. Quality of Governance uses a 11
scale measure the trust in the legal system are in the judiciary, please tell me on a score of 0-10
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how much you personally trust legal system, on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 representing low and 10
representing high.
Independent Variable
To capture judicial independence, I use Linzer and Staton (2015)’s latent variable of
judicial independence as my main independent variable. The variable is bound between 0−1,
where 1 represents the highest levels of judicial independence, and ranges from 0.012−0.995 in
the data.
To measure the level of democracy, I use the Liberal Democracy Index from the
Varieties of Democracy project, which assesses the protection of civil liberties, the presence of
rule of law and an independent judiciary, as well as effective checks and balances (Coppedge et
al., 2021). I use this variable to subset my data into democracies and non-democracies. This way
I can evaluate the effects of each of my independent variables across regime type.
I measure education as the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age,
expressed as a percentage of the population official secondary education.
For the economy, I use GDP per capita and unemployment are taken by World Data
Bank.
Finally, I include a variable for corruption using the Corruption Index developed by
Transparency International, which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, as determined by expert surveys
(Transparency International 2016). The Corruption index measures “the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007:
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4). This data source ranks a country based on its level of corruption from 0 (highly corrupt) to
100 (no corruption).
Before running my model, I evaluate the correlation matrix of my variables. The results
for the correlation between the country-level variables and public confidence in the courts are
shown in Table 1, and I provide descriptive statistics in Table 2. Democracy, GDP per capita,
and institutional corruption had positive correlations for public confidence in courts. In addition,
unemployment correlates with confidence in courts and it is expected to that with high
unemployment rate reduces trust. As can be observed, there is a very strong, relationship
between corruption and judicial trust variables as was expected, indicating that trust in political
institutions is higher when corruption is low.
The level of corruption, then, seems to be the most significant factor associated to
political trust. On the democracy level, seems to be positively related to the level of political
trust. In fact, countries with “better” democracies tend to present higher levels of political trust
than those countries with lower scores and it generally support the hypotheses formulated earlier,
with additional unexpected findings regarding the association between the level of democracy
and the correlation between level of democracy and education. These descriptive results show
that I should have no problem with multicollinearity issues, as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix between confidence in court at the national-level variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Confidence of the Judiciary

1

2. Level of Democracy

.05**

1

3. Corruption

-.27**

.35**

1

4. Judicial Independence

.07

-.04

.11

1

5. Education rate

.53***

.10

-.37**

.26**

1

6. GDP per Capita

.08

.06

.10

.25**

.32

1

7. Unemployment Rate

.06**

.08

-.15

.06**

.17

.23

1

Notes: *p<.05, **p< .01,

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for study variables

National level

N- countries Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Judicial Independence

19

0.52

0.32

0

1

Level of democracy

19

8.54

1.01

1.91

7.99

Education Level

19

85.85

29.40

11

158.4

Corruption index

19

1.63

1.56

14.00

84.00

GDP per Capita

19

28.94

17.80

1.05

83.56

Unemployment rate

19

2.55

3.29

2.50

19.60
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2.3 Results and Discussions
I run two fixed effects regression models to evaluate my hypotheses since I have panel
data. The first model is a fixed effects model for democracies only, and the second model is a
fixed effects model for non-democracies to capture the differential effects across regimes. Table
3 shows the results for both models.

Table 3: OLS regression results for Trust in Latin American Courts (National-Level)

Variables
Judicial Independence

Education

Corruption Index

GDP per Capita

Unemployment

Constant

Fixed

Fixed

effects

effects

Democracies

Non-Democracies

.034**

.100

(.009)

(.169)

.063**

0.36

(.024)

(.021)

.065***

.028**

(.008)

(.012)

.049**

.057**

(.035)

(.017)

0.033*

.124*

(.026)

(.043)

.306**

.452**

(.070)

(.069)

.366

.449

11,542

10, 235

Adjusted R2

N
Notes: * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; Standard errors in parentheses
15

This table shows that in the democratic countries, education has a greater positive effect
on democracies than it does in less democratic ones, we can say that in the case of education and
trust. I can also see that the relationship is strong and positive in democracies, although it
becomes weaker as the level of democracy declines, and it will eventually turn negative, and will
exbibit negative effects in non-democratic countries. In contrast, for non-democratic countries,
will be lower among the more educated, and higher among the less educated, so in this case,
more highly educated citizens will have less trust on the legal system.
Based on the results the judicial independence shows a positive impact on a individuals’
confidence in the justice system. This result leads me to affirm my first hypothesis, H1: The
higher the degree of judicial independence in a given country, the more likely national courts
enjoy public trust. meaning that citizens who lives in a country that has an independent judiciary
will express high level of trust compare to citizens who lives in a country where the judiciary is
not independent.
I also find that economic development matters too because trust is achieved when there is
high level of economic development, for corruption demonstrates that in effect is an important
factor and has a bigger effect than any other variable.
The results show the impact of corruption on trust in institutions. As can be observed, the
coefficient is positive and highly significant on both models (non-democracies and democracies)
this indicates that political trust is higher when there is less corruption, and is lower when there is
more corruption in each country. By testing corruption between non- democracies and
democracies permits me to compare the means effects of corruption in both models. In effect,
the coefficient for the variable measuring control of corruption is positive, indicating more trust
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when there is lower corruption, and highly significant, and we can also say citizens in highly
corrupt countries were less likely to have greater confidence in the court systems.
The effects of corruption and economic development on trust remain highly significant in
this model, indicating that they do have an independent effect on judicial trust. I see that GDP
per capita is significant in both models meaning that the higher level of GDP a country has, the
higher the levels of political trust will be. GDP per capita gives a country’s standard average of
living, and can bee have seen as an indicator on welfare. If GDP goes down, the standard average
goes down as well, and naturally citizens trust and satisfaction in political institutions goes down,
this confirms my hypothesis.
Furthermore, I find a negative relationship and highly significant on the unemployment
variable which this leads me to reject H6: Lower levels of unemployment is associated with
increased public trust. The unemployment level has increased so significantly that it should
affect levels of trust. It is expected that an increase in unemployment will reduce trust. Also, in
countries where the financial crisis has caused a significant increase in unemployment, it is
expected that this has affected trust in a negative way.
This chapter examined national-level factors that impact public trust in Latin American
courts and are summarized as follows. First, judicial independence does promote trust when the
judicial system is more independent of external political forces, the greater that an individual will
have higher level of confidence in the judicial system.
In addition, this chapter contributes to the understanding of the relationship between
economic development and trust I can conclude that performance and how government handles
the economy is important for the citizens because if there is a financial crisis, and the
government does not handle the economic situation this will provide higher discontent from the
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public. Lastly, corruption is the strongest predictor of trust in institutions among Latin American
countries hinders government’s performance leading to low levels of trust.
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Chapter 3
Individual Determinants of Trust in Latin American Courts
In addition to national political environments, individual characteristics can also impact a
person’s level trust in courts. Individual experiences and positionality within society can impact
their expectations and evaluation of political institutions, including courts. Thus, this chapter
examines the individual-level determinants that impact public trust in Latin American courts.
3.1 Theory
Education
One of the factors that impacts individual level of trust is education. Many authors have
argued that the less educated people have higher confidence in their judicial institutions than
highly educated individuals (Boateng 2015; Leventhal 1980; Lissak and Sheppard 1983; Segovia
2008; Sheppard and Lewicki 1987; Tyler 2000). Specifically, the authors observed that people
who have a high school education were more likely to have higher confidence in the judiciary
than those with more than high school education. In other words, highly educated individuals
perceive the courts less favorably than less educated persons. According to Putnam (2000),
social capital increases trust in authorities because it increases citizens’ awareness of and
knowledge of how institutions work and, in essence, would enable them to influence the
institutions’ operational policies. For courts, for instance, gaining adequate knowledge in the
operations of the judiciary will not only enhance positive attitudes people hold toward the courts
but will also enable the citizens to develop an informed expectation of the justice system and,
accordingly, will know what exactly they can expect from the courts. Hence, in non-democratic
states, increased education levels are likely to reduce courts’ support because individuals are
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increasingly aware of how the court processes and outcomes differ from their ideal or normative
roles.
H1: Individuals with higher levels of education will express lower confidence in courts
relative to individuals with less education.
Corruption
Corruption causes distrust among citizens, thus leading to the problem of institutional
legitimacy. For example, Anderon and Tverdova (2003) contend that people who perceive a
higher level of corruption evaluate them negatively, meaning corruption exacerbates discontent
with the political system’s performance. Seligson (2002) similarly demonstrates with four Latin
American countries that people’s corruption experiences are negatively correlated with diffuse
support. From this perspective, there is a negative relationship between judicial trust and
corruption: the lower the level of corruption (or perception of corruption), the higher the level of
political trust.
For example, Sabet (2012) focuses on examining the factors contributing to citizens’
reduced trust in Mexico’s police. He demonstrated that direct bribery is a major cause of
reducing trust. In contrast to Boateng (2016) finds that citizens’ experiences of police corruption
will have a negative effect on their trust in the police. Tankebe (2010) tested corruption on the
police and observed that citizens who experienced corruption directly would express less trust.
Their studies have shown that both forms of experience negatively influence citizens’
evaluations of the police: one, the actual performance, which involves citizens encountering
institutional corruption, in this case, the courts. The second form, indirect experience indirect is
the knowledge about individuals’ personal experiences with the corruption.
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Corruption is one of the biggest threats against effective protection of rights since people
depend on independent and impartial courts when claiming individual rights breaches. Courts
have an enormous responsibility with their monopoly to resolve all conflicts of judicial nature,
and corrupt courts cannot take that responsibility. “The judiciary is the ultimate upholder of
individual rights, and it is therefore supposed to fight corruption, not be a part of it” (Folkesson
2010). I expect that a justice system with widespread corruption cannot fulfill its essential
constitutional role as the branch of government entrusted with political oversight, upholding the
rule of law, and protecting individual rights, thus lowers public trust in the institution.
H2: Individuals who have experienced or perceived corruption have reduced support for
courts.
Demographics
Over the years, many compelling arguments and empirical findings have put forward a
significant relationship between trust and demographic characteristics of individual (Boateng
2016; Leventhal 1980; Lissak and Sheppard 1983; Sheppard and Lewicki 1987; Smithey 2019;
Tyler 2000). Smithey (2019) notes that several individual characteristics, such as education,
political knowledge, interpersonal trust, and income are associated with higher trust levels in
legal institutions. Demographics variables, such as age and gender, have also been explored by
prior research. I include gender because individuals may have different confidence levels if that
person were treated differently because of gender.
Latin America continues to be the region with high levels of gender inequality. The
CIDH (Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos) has observed that violence,
discrimination, and difficulties in accessing justice affect women differently are particularly
exposed to the impairment of their rights. It has been found that the obstacles they face can be
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particularly critical. They suffer from various combined forms of discrimination because they are
women, their ethnic or racial origin, or their socio-economic condition. Then if women are
systematically discriminated against in the system, they are more likely to express lower levels
of trust. Hence, I generate the following hypothesis:
H3: Women will express lower confidence in the justice system than men.
Many studies have examined the influence of age on individuals’ attitudes toward the
judiciary and have found a positive relationship between age and perception of the courts
(Boateng 2015; Brown and Benedict 2002; Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; Chemak et al. 2001;
Cheurprakobkit 2000; Hurst and Frank 2000; Marenin 1983; Merry et al. 2012; Miller 2017).
Boateng (2015) finds that older persons have higher confidence in the police compared to
younger persons. This indirectly supports the conclusion that younger persons view the
institution less favorably (Murphy and Worrall 1999; Boateng 2015). Cheistensen and Laegried
(2005) examine how trust varies in the Norwegian government among different groups of
citizens and found older people generally have more trust in governmental institutions than
younger people. In which I formulate the following hypothesis:
H4: As age increases, so does confidence in the justice system.
Finally, I evaluate the role of media exposure on public trust. Media plays a vital role in
projecting images of the general government public, which can either support the assumption
that the judicial system is functional or become a critical source of questioning its effectiveness
and accountability. For example, some studies claim that the media’s harsh criticism of the
government undermines public trust in the government (Curry and Corral-Camacho 2008;
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000). It is my expectation that:
H5: Citizens with higher level of media exposure will have decreased judicial trust.
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3.2 Methods
Individual-level data were obtained from the fifth wave of Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from Vanderbilt University 2018 dataset. LAPOP assessed
people’s attitudes toward democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues from
a cross-national perspective to facilitate discussions across cultures. Specifically, I use this data
to analyze individual-level responses in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Dependent variable
My dependent variable is confidence in courts of law. One question asked respondents to
rate their degree of trust, to what extent do you trust the justice system? LAPOP uses seven
category questions to measure how confident the respondents are in the judiciary on a scale of 0
to 6, with 0 representing low confidence and 6 representing high confidence.
Independent variables
Education measures the amount of formal education that the respondent received. The
variable was measured as 0=No formal education, 1= middle school, 2= GED or high school, 3=
higher national diploma, 4= Bachelors, and 5 = Graduate /professional degree.
The second independent variable is corruption, measured as respondent’s answer to the
question: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? (0= no, 1 = yes).
This measure thus captures direct experiences with judicial corruption. I also include a measure
for indirect corruption perceptions, where individuals may believe courts are corrupt without any
direct experience. For indirect corruption, I use respondents’ answer to the question: having
accounted for your experiences, or what you have heard, how generalizable do you think
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corruption is among public officials? Very = 3, Somewhat = 2, Not very = 1, Not generalizable =
0.”
Additionally, I include institutional support, which is a single-item response measure that
asks the survey respondent the extent to which he or she has respect for the country’s political
institutions generally. The respondents rate their confidence level on a scale from 0 to 6; a score
of 0 indicates the lowest level of confidence, and 6 represents the highest.
I also add a human rights variable, asking the respondent to what extent they say the
current court system protects human rights (0 to 6) and a rule of law variable, measured by
whether the authorities should always respect the law? (1= yes, 0 = no). These variables allow
me to measure more than just general satisfaction with the way the justice system is handled but
the specifics problems like corruption respecting human rights and supporting the rule of law that
speaks for perceived fairness of the legal system.
I coded gender Male = 1 Female = 0. Age is a count variable corresponding to the
respondent’s age when the survey was administered. Age ranges from 16 to 97 in the sample.
The income variables are personal and annual household income were measured in terms
of respondents’ annual household income. Respondents were asked to indicate their household’s
income per year (0= less than 5,000, 1 = 5,000 to 10,000, 2 = 10,001 to 15,000, and 3 = more
than 15,000). Any respondent who earns 10,000 or below was considered a low-income earner.
Also, I include employment variable. Respondents were asked during this time period
where you employed or not, coded 1 for employed respondents and 0 for unemployed
respondents. I expect that employed respondents will have higher confidence in the justice
system.
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I also account for media exposure was measured by a single 4-point item asking
respondents to indicate the extent to which they hear news about the courts through the mass
media. The response categories included 0= never, (1) rarely, (2) sometimes, (3) almost
constantly, and (4) always.
The bivariate correlations among variables were examined. As shown in Table 4, public
confidence in the courts was significantly and positively correlated with human rights, support of
rule of law, gender, perceived corruption, and income. This positive relationship suggests that
these characteristics result in increased levels of confidence in the courts when no variable is
controlled. However, media exposure had negative confidence in the courts.

Table 4: Correlation Matrix between confidence in courts at the Individual-level variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1. Confidence in the Judiciary 1
2. Support Rule of Law

-.01

.1

3. Perceived fairness

.01*

-35

4. Perceived corruption

-.05** .24* -.13

1

5. Human Rights

.45**

-.28 1

6. Education

-.04** -.26

.21

-.28 -.07 1

7. Gender

.07**

.19

-.11

-.04 -.11 -.05 1

8. Age

-.08

-.27

.09

.08

-.09 -.09 -.12

1

9. Income

.09**

.25

.43

.17

.02

.17

10. Employment

.54**

.50

.20

.08

-.07 -.45 .06

11. Media Exposure

.25*

.34* .12* -.21 -.56 .11

1

.60* .33

Notes: *p<.05, **p< .01, ***p<.001
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-.07 .19

1

-.01 -.01 1

.17** .30

.24

.05* 1

Table 5 presents the individual respondents’ characteristics, about 51% of the
respondents were females and most of the respondents were employed. In terms of education,
most respondents had attained secondary education, followed by below secondary (60%) and
(40%) for post-secondary. Majority of the respondents (47 percent) mentioned that, they
sometimes are exposed to media. This is followed by 18 percent of the respondents who almost
always hear news about the courts through the media, and 19 percent indicated always.
Nevertheless, few respondents (11 percent) either almost never or never hear news about the
court system through the media. Finally, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree
or disagree that the legal system are corrupt. Most of the respondents strongly agreed that the
judicial system is corrupt, indicating that that corruption is a severe problem for judicial trust.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for study variables (Individual level)
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

45,356

2.97

1.70

Support Rule of Law

44,476

1.81

.89

Perceived fairness

42.982

1.35

.14

Per. corruption

40,298

2.32

.20

Human Rights

45,356

3.89

.90

Education

44,856

2.63

1.56

45,356

60

Outcome variable
DV- Trust in the judiciary
Independent Variables
Individual Level

Senior HS or Below

26

More than HS

45,356

40

44,770

.51

.50

Age (16- 97)

45,356

39

14.38

Income

38,091

5.63

2.13

Employed

45,356

2.14

1.71

Media exposure

44,853

.85

1.63

Gender
Female

Never

5.7

Rarely

5.1

Sometimes

47.9

Almost

22.2

3.3 Results and discussions

Table 6 presents the results of OLS regression with country fixed effects to account the
effects of several individual predictors on trust in the courts.
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Table 6: OLS regression results for trust in Latin American Courts (individual level)
Fixed
Effects
Independent Variables
-0.170

Support Rule of Law

(0.065)
-0.016

Perceived fairness

(0.020)
-0.04*

Perceived corruption

(0.033)
0.056**

Human Rights

(0.021)
0.001**

Education

(0.001)
-0.012**

Gender

(0.009)
0.027**

Age

(0.042)
-0.027

Income

(0.008)
.038**

Employed

(.014)
0.103

Media exposure

(0.065)

Constant

1.724***

N

45,356

Adj R2

.78

Notes: * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses

28

The model significantly explains the variance in trust in the judiciary. The rule of law has
a positive but insignificant effect on public trust in Latin American courts. Persons who
possessed high education were more likely to express higher trust in the courts than those who
possessed high school education or less this leads to reject my hypothesis. Perceived corruption
negatively and significantly impact on citizen's trust in the legal system citizens who have been
victims of corruption are likely to trust less, and the more times they have been victims the lower
is their trust.
In addition, employment, gender, age, and human rights all had statistical significance
with trust in the legal system. Holding constant the rest of variables, males in Latin America
show higher levels of trust in courts than women, this leads me to confirm my hypothesis, H3:
Women will express lower confidence in the justice system than men. A possible explanation
would be that many women who have faced legal proceedings for gender violence say that they
did not feel believed and understood by the courts. I also see that older people trust more in
courts than those who are younger. Lastly, for employed respondents exhibited positive and
significant levels of trust in the courts confirms that employed respondents will be more likely to
trust the judiciary than those without employment.
The results presented in this chapter are consistent and important determinants of trust in
Latin American courts at the individual level. Now in order to have a further understanding on
the determinants of judicial trust, in Latin America, I need to combine the national-levels with
individual level variables. Thus, a multilevel technique will help to understand and explain the
levels of trust in Latin America.
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Chapter 4
Public Trust in Latin American Courts: A Hierarchical Linear Model
The previous two chapters aimed to examine the country-level and the individual-level
correlations of trust in Latin American courts. Following Hakherdian and Mayne (2012), this
chapter aims to build a model that could include both levels of analysis: the national and
individual-level correlations of trust and their interactions in Latin American courts. The
multilevel model allows concurrent consideration of causal mechanisms, both the individual and
environmental, calculates the standard errors at the group level (Gelman and Hill 2007; Ralie
2011).
4.1 Data and methods
In order to complete this exploration on the determinants of political trust in Latin
America, is to combine the effect of country-levels measures of corruption together with
individual-level variables in order to assess the relevance of each one in a single model. There
has been a lot of research that presents several options are available to solve this problem, and
the most appropriate is to develop a model that would explicitly consider hierarchical or
multilevel structures, and that allows me to measure the effect of different variables to explain
variations from both levels (Boateng 2016; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Goldstein 1999; Segovia
2008; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
First, I run an ANOVA analysis to evaluate whether there is sufficient variation in the
levels of trust both at the individual and national-levels of analysis. The one-way ANOVA, the
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether the mean of a dependent
variable is the same in two or more unrelated, independent groups (Laerd Statistics). If there is a
considerable variation occurring both at the individual and national levels, then a hierarchical
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could model those variations. Equations 1, 2, and 3 show how this model is set up, and then I
present in Table 7 the results of the ANOVA analysis for Latin American courts.
The level-1 or individual-level model is shown in equation (1) below:
Yij = β0j + rij
This his model characterizes levels of judicial trust for each individual
with just an intercept β0j, which in this case is the country mean. In other words, the level of
judicial trust for a given individual, i, within a given country, j, is equal to the mean level of
judicial trust for that country plus an error term, rij.
At level-2 or in this case national -level, each country’s mean judicial trust, β0j, is
represented as a function of the grand mean –that is, the mean across individuals and
countries-, γ00, plus a random error, u0j. The level-2 or national-level model is shown in
equation (2) below:
β0j = γ00 + u0j
This yields a combined model, also often referred to as a mixed model with fixed
effect γ00, and random effects u0j and rij. This is shown in equation (3) below:
Yij = γ00 + u0j + rij
Table 7 presents the results of the ANOVA model. The results presented show that the
weighted least squares estimate for the grand mean judicial trust is 2.03, with a corresponding
standard error of 0.05 (p = 0.000).
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Table 7: One -way ANOVA
Approx.
Fixed Effect
Mean Judicial Trust

Coefficient

Std. Error

T- ratio

d.f

p-value

2.03

0.05

28.613

5

0

Variance
Random Effect -

Std. Dev

Component

Individual Level

0.35

0.06

National Level

0.57

.38

Chi
df

Square

p-value

5

663.76

0

I tested formally whether the estimated value of the variance is significantly greater than
zero. If not, then it may be sensible to assume that all countries have the same mean. This test
statistic has a large sample χ2 distribution with J-1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis.
In our case, the test statistic takes on a value of 663.76 with 5 degrees of freedom. The null
hypothesis is highly implausible (p = 0.000), indicating that significant variation does exist
among countries in their levels of trust, meaning that the multilevel model of judicial trust data
should not be ignored.
Now that I know that judicial trust can and should be explained by the individual- as
well as country-level factors, I can account for the variance in judicial trust. Equation 4 shows
the individual-level model to be estimated:
Yij = β0j + β1j Inst. S ij + β2j RespectHR ij + β3j Education ij + β4j s. Rule ij +
β5j Per.Fair ij + β6j Per. Corrupt ij + β7jGender ij +
β8jAge ij +β9jIncome ij +β10jMedia ij +β11jEmployed ij + rij
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Yij is the level of judicial trust (dependent variable) for an individual i within a country
(nation) j; β0j is the average level of trust for a given country; βxj are the effects of the individual
variables in the outcome, and rij is the error term.
The country-level model includes Β0j is the mean average of trust for country j; γ is the
effects of the country-level variables included in the model, and u0j is the error term. In this
model, intercepts for different countries are allowed to vary as a function of the variables
included, plus an error term. In other words, individuals’ members of different countries will
present different levels of trust depending not only on their perceptions of performance (or the
other variables included in the individual-level model). Those levels of trust will also vary on
specific characteristics of their countries.
The full model can be seen in equation (6) below:
Yij = γ00 + γ01JItj + γ02Demj+ γ03EDUj + γ04Umemploymentj + γ05GDPj + γ06Corruptj
+ γ10 Per. Fair ij + γ20 Per.Corrupt ij + γ30 Respect HR ij +γ40 Education ij + γ50 Inst. S ij +
γ60 Gender ij + γ70Ageij + γ80Incomeij + + u0j + rij
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4.2 Multilevel Results and discussion
The analysis results are Model 1 in Table 8, which includes all the individual-level
variables as well as the national level measures together.

Table 8: Multilevel Regression results for Public Trust in Latin American Courts
Model 1
2.012**

Constant

(0.198)

Individual Level
0.10**

Support Rule of Law

(.004)
.023

Perceived fairness

(.021)
-.112**

Perceived corruption

(0.023)
.0.11**

Human Rights

(.018)
-.018**

Education

(0.26)
.021

Gender

(.027)
.049

Ethnicity

(.018)
.001

Age

(.001)
.055**

Income

(.018)
0.24**

Employed

(.003)
34

-.111**

Media exposure

(.052)

National Level
.142**

Level of democracy

(.014)
.68**

Judicial Independence

(.019)
-.032

Education Level

(.002)
-.093**

Corruption Index

(.060)
.077**

GDP per Capita

(.017)
.059**

Unemployment Rate

(.019)

N (individuals)

45,356

N (country)

19

Adjusted R2

.32

Notes: *p<.05, **p< .01, ***p<.001 Standard errors in parenthesis

I find significant relationships between perceived performance of the justice system and
support for the rule of law. The greater someone’s trust in courts, the more likely they are to feel
obligated to follow the law. Also, we observe a great effect of the variables measuring
perceptions of trustworthiness. This effect, moreover, is in the direction that we predicted: people
perceiving the courts as trustworthy do present higher levels of trust than those who consider
them untrustworthy. The variables show positive and significant coefficients that go in the
expected direction. In other words, the results show that controlling for other factors, citizens
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who trust others, who support institutions, and who consider supporting democracy tend to
display, as expected, higher levels of judicial trust.
Finally, media exposure was equally significant, and with a negative coefficient citizen
who frequently experience with the legal system through the media have lower trust in the
courts. Although age, gender, and ethnicity had no effect on this model.
The income variable is significant and indicating that personal perception of the state in
the economy is an important component in level of judicial trust. The measure indicates, as
expected, that the more satisfied citizens are with the state of the economy, the higher political
trust he or she has. The results from this model also illustrate, as expected, that when including
this measure, only one of the macroeconomic measures has a significant effect. It can be argued
that this is because individual’s perception about the state of the economy is formed by the actual
situation.
In effect, the coefficients are positive (indicating an increase of trust for those on the
winning side) and highly significant in every case. The variables measuring institutional fairness
and competence appear to be the most important ones in this model. The coefficients are positive
in all cases, indicating that trust in courts increases as respondents express a better evaluation of
judicial performance and fairness. On the other side, trust is considerably lower when the courts
are considered unfair and incompetent in their actions. Overall, the coefficients are highly
significant in each case.
Also, it demonstrates that the perception for corruption and respect human rights are very
important and is inversely related to judicial trust and it is important for two reasons, the first one
is that citizens consider that courts are fair in their treatment of people when they think that
courts are competent and doing a good job when they believe that there is respect for human
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rights. What’s very interesting is that looking at corruption both individual and national level
shows negative but statistically significant which means when individuals perceive and
experience corruption will tend to reduce their confidence in the institutions compared to an
individual who views corruption as a minor problem, they are more willing to grant their trust
institutions.
On the level of democracy is significant meaning that citizens living in countries with
greater levels of democracy tend to have higher trust in the courts than those living in countries
with decreased levels of democracy. Moreover, citizens in highly corrupt countries were less
likely to have greater trust in the court systems. This means that a person who lives in a country
with an independent judiciary, will express high level of trust. Finally, economic performance
does impact levels of trust. The unemployment level, that has a positive relationship with judicial
trust thus, I can confirm that A low level of unemployment is associated with high political trust.
This indicates that a country that experienced increase unemployment, will have citizens reduced
trust.
The results obtained and shown in this chapter the determinants of judicial trust in Latin
America. I have showed that judicial trust has a strong impact on the level of corruption and is
consistent meaning that corruption reduces judicial trust. With respect to the results of this
chapter we can conclude the following. First, we have seen that levels of trust vary both levels
and using a multilevel technique helped us to understand the relationship the factors of trust in
Latin American courts.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This study aimed to examine the public trust in Latin American courts examining at the
national level and individual level and combining them at a multilevel model to have full
understanding the relationship between trust and the courts. We learned that trust develops when
such expectations are met, and, by contrast, distrust occurs when expectations are not met. We
also see that the judicial trust is crucial for the stability of a democracy.
The sole component of legitimacy of the court is confidence. It is, therefore, important to
know the determinants of confidence in this case the justice system. Thus, citizens who believe
that the judiciary’s performance meets their expectations do not hesitate to trust the institution.
However, those who believe their expectations are not met will distrust the courts.
First, the study’s findings support the general assumption that citizens’ trust and
confidence in institutions increase as their perceptions of an institutional performance increase
(Boateng 2016; Bouckaert et al. 2002; Espinal et al. 2006;). This assumption was derived from
the judicial performance, which has been used to explain variations in trust in Latin American
courts. Many scholars believed that individuals who think that courts perform up to acceptable
standards tend to express greater levels of trust and confidence in the judicial system (Maarten
Van Crean 2012; Boateng 2016). Also, they argued that those who perceive agencies to perform
poorly would nevertheless have lower confidence in the institution.
Findings made in this thesis suggest that the judiciary’s bad performance has reduced
citizens’ trust in political institutions, at least in countries where the crisis has had a severe
impact. Goldsmith (2005) and Boateng (2016) have examined several factors that could
undermine police trust. These factors include neglect, indifference, incompetence, venality,
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extortion, discrimination, intimidation, inconsistency, and excessive use of corruption. We can
clearly see that citizens who perceive and experience corruption withing the courts, their levels
of trust decrease significantly. Nadarevi (2020), argues that when individuals must bribe the
courts with money or favors to receive a favorable outcome, it becomes increasingly difficult for
them to believe that the legal system is legitimate and accountable. “If money buys justice,
then what purpose does equality under the law serve?”
Finally, political trust matters. Controlling for other factors, political trust is a predictor of
the levels of support for democracy and the level of political participation that people declare,
which I call the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of democracy. Political trust increases
support for democracy as a political regime and increases the level of satisfaction that citizens
expressed on their democracies’ workings. Thus, support at the level of institutions increases
support at the level of the regime (Segovia 2008).
Trust links ordinary citizens to the institutions intended to represent them (Bianco 1994),
thereby enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic government (Gamson 1968;
Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hetherington 1998; Segovia 2008). Fair treatment is an important
indicator of citizens’ attitudes toward the judicial system. It is suggested that, as the judges aim
at ensuring effective performance to satisfy the public, they must also endeavor to treat citizens
fairly, respectfully, and transparent.

39

References
Acock, Alan C. 2016. “A Gentle Introduction to Stata. Fifth Edition.” Stata Press.
Aibar, Julio & Vázquez, Daniel. 2009. “¿Autoritarismo o Democracia? Hugo Chávez y Evo
Morales.” Flasco Mexico.
Alesina, Alberto, and Romain Wacziarg. 2000. “The Economics of Civic Trust”. In Disaffected
Democracies. What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? edited by S. J. Pharr and R. D.
Putnam. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Aydin, Cakir, and Eser Sekercioglu. 2016. “Public Confidence in the Judiciary: The Interaction
between Political Awareness and Level of Democracy.” Democratization 23: 634-56.
Boateng, Francis D. and Adjorlolo, Samuel. 2019. ‘Judicial Trustworthiness in Africa: Do
Macro-Level Conditions Matter?’, Crime and Delinquency, 65:12, 1689-710.
Boateng, Francis D. 2016. “Neighborhood-Level Effects on Trust in the Police: A Multilevel
Analysis.” International Criminal Justice Review.
Boateng, Francis D., Heeuk, D. Lee, & Abess, Gassan. 2016. “Analyzing citizens’ reported
levels of confidence in the police: A cross-national study of public attitudes toward the
police in the United States and South Korea.” Asian Journal of Criminology.
Boateng, Francis D. 2013. “Restoring the Lost Hope: A Multidimensional Approach for
Building Public Trust in the Police.” The Journal of the Institute of Justice &
International Studies
Booth, John A. & Seligson Mitchell A. 2009. The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political
Support and Democracy in Eight Nations. Cambridge University Press.
Bratton, Michael, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2016. “Do Trustworthy Institutions Matter for
Development? Corruption, Trust, and Government Performance in Latin America.”

40

Bühlmann Marc and Kunz, Ruth. 2011. “Confidence in the Judiciary: Comparing the
Independence and Legitimacy of Judicial Systems.” West European Politics, 34:2, 317
345.
Caldeira, G., & Gibson, J. (1992). “The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court.”
American Journal of Political Science, 36(3), 635-664
Castagnola Andrea & Perez-Linan Anıbal. 2011. “Bolivia: The Rise (and Fall) of Judicial.”
Review Courts in Latin America, edited by Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-Figueroa,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 55–80.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. 2005. “Trust in Government: The Relative Importance of Service
Satisfaction, Political Factors, and Demography.” Public Performance & Management
Review, 28(4), 487-511.
Clark, Tom S. 2011. “The Limits of Judicial Independence”. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Claure, M., Cortés, E., Barella, D., Nicté, F., Guzmán, A., & Galassi, J. (2019).
“Transformaciones políticas en Bolivia y nuevos sentidos de la democracia.” In
LEYTON J. (Ed.), Bolivia hoy: ¿una democracia poscolonial o anticolonial? (pp. 161
192)
Chang, E. C., &Chu, Y. H. 2006. “Corruption and trust: exceptionalism in Asian
democracies?” The Journal of Politics, 68(2), 259-271.
CIDH.2007. Acceso a la Justicia para las mujeres víctimas de violencia en las Américas. OEA,
Washington, D.C.,

41

Citrin, Jack and Christopher Muste. 1999. “Trust in Government.” In John P. Robinson, Phillip
R. Shaver and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, eds., Measures of Political Attitudes. San
Diego: Academic Press.
Cameron, C, and Miller, D. 2015. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference” Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Diamond, Larry. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan J. Linz. 1999. “Introduction: Politics, Society, and
Democracy in Latin America.” In Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz and
Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.,
Diamond, Larry. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy. New York: Times Books
Diamond, Larry. 2015. “Facing up to the Democratic Recession.” Journal of Democracy 26:
141-55.
Domingo, P. 2006, “Weak Courts and Legal Mobilization Strategies in Bolivia” in Gargarella,
Roberto, Pilar Domingo, and Theunis Roux, (eds), Courts and social transformation. An
institutional voice for the poor? New trends in social rights litigation, Ashgate, pp.233254.
Domingo, P. 2006. “Judicial Politics in Latin America” in South America, Central America, and
the Caribbean, Europa Publications.
Domingo, P.2012.“Rule of law, judicial reform and transitional justice in Latin America” in
Vesselin Popovski and Monica Serrano (eds) Transitional Justice and Democratic

42

Consolidation: Comparing the Effectiveness of the Accountability Mechanisms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America, UNU Press, pp.41-63.
Donoso, Juan Carlos. 2009. “A Means to an End: Judicial Independence, Corruption, and the
Rule of Law in Latin America.” Doctoral Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.
Easton, David. 1965. A framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall.
Enders, Craig K. and Tofighi, Davood(2007).“Centering Predictor Variables in Cross-Sectional
Multilevel Models: A New Look at an Old Issue.” Psychological Methods, vol. 12, pg.
121-138
Fagerland Kroknes, Veronica, Jakobsen, Tor G. & Grønning Lisa.M.2015. “Economic
Performance and Political Trust: The impact of the financial crisis on European citizens,”
European Societies, 17:5, 700-723,
Faundez, Julio. 2005. “Democratization through law: Perspectives from Latin America,”
democratization, 12:5, 749-765.
Feld, L. and Voigt S.2003. “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators'”. European Journal of Political Economy, pp.
497-517.
Gibson, J.L. (2007). ‘The Legitimacy of the US Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity’, Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies,4:3, 507
Gibson J.L.,and Caldeira, G.A. 2009. ‘Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration of
Public Ignorance of the High Court’, Journal of Politics,71:2,429-41.
Gibson, J.L., G.A. Caldeira, and V.A. Baird .1998. ‘On the Legitimacy of National High
Courts’, American Political Science Review, 92:2, 343-58.

43

Gibson, J.L., G.A. Caldeira, and L.K. Spence .2003. ‘Measuring Attitudes toward the United
States Supreme Court’, American Journal of Political Science, 47:2,354-67.
Gibson, J.L., M.Lodge,andB.Woodson. 2014.‘Losing, but Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity
Theory, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority’, Law and Society Review, 48:4,837-66
Hagopian, Frances and Mainwaring, Scott P. 2008. eds., The Third Wave of Democratization in
Latin America: Advances and Setbacks. Cambridge University Press.
Hakhverdian, A., & Mayne, Q. 2012. “Institutional trust, education, and corruption: A micro
macro interactive approach.” The Journal of Politics, 74(3), 739-750.
Helmke, Gretchen. 2017. Institutions on the Edge: The Origins and Consequences of Inter
Branch Crises in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
Hox, Joe. 2017. Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications. Third edition. London,
Erlbaum.
Hsieh, M.-L., & Boateng, F. D. (2015). “Perceptions of democracy and trust in the criminal
justice system: a comparison between mainland China and Taiwan”. International
Criminal Justice Review, 25(2), 153–173.
Huntington, Samuel P.1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, & Michael Hennessy. 2007. “Public Understanding of and Support
for the Courts: Survey Results.” The Georgetown Law Journal 95: 899-902.
Jones, Mark P., 2012. “The Diversity of Latin American Democracy.” World Politics Review
March 2012: 9-14.
Lagos, Marta. 2001. “How People View Democracy: Between Stability and Crisis in Latin \
America.” Journal of Democracy 12:137-45.

44

Laerd Statistics.2021. https://statistics.laerd.com/spss-tutorials/one-way-anova-using-spss
statistics.php
Lott, Joe, & Antony, James. 2012. Multilevel Modeling Techniques and Applications in
Institutional Research. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Mainwaring, Scott., & Perez- Lina, Anibal. 2013. Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin
America: Emergence, Survival and Fall. Cambridge University Press.
Maas, C. J. M., Hox, Joop J. 2005. Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling. Methodology
1(3): 86–92.
McAllister, Ian (1999) “The economic performance of governments” In Pippa Norris (ed.)
Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford
University press, pp. 204-216.
Mejia- Moriz, B. 2004. Corrupción Judicial en Perú: Causas, Formas y Alternativas (Vol. 17).
N.p.: DERECHO & SOCIEDAD.: 1-8
Miller, S. 2017. The Effect of Terrorism on Judicial Confidence. Political Research Quarterly,
70(4), 790- 802.
Millet, Richard. 2009. ‘‘Democratic Consolidation in Latin America?’’ In Latin American
Democracy: Emerging reality or endangered species? eds, Richard L.
Millet, Jennifer S. Holmes, Orlando J. Pérez. New York: Routledge
Morris, Stephen D., and Charles H. Blake. 2009. Introduction: Political and Analytical
Challenges of Corruption in Latin America. In Corruption and Democracy in Latin
America, ed. Blake and Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Montoya, A. 2015. Corte Constitucional colombiana: De la independencia judicial al activismo
progresista. In Si no vas al senado no te eligen magistrado.: Instituciones informales y

45

criterios de selección de los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional colombiana en el
Senado (1992-2009) (pp. 39-50). Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Universidad de los Andes,
Colombia.
Morales Quiroga, Mauricio. 2009. Corrupción y democracia: América Latina en perspectiva
comparada. Gestión y política pública, 18(2), 205-252.
Norris, Pippa.1999. “The growth of critical citizens?” in Pippa Norris (Ed.) Critical citizens:
Global support for democratic government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-27.
O’Donell, Guillermo. 2003. “Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization of
Mistrust.” Democratic Accountability in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and
Christopher Welna, Oxford University Press, pp. 35-54.
Rabe-Hesketh, S., & Skrondal, A. 2012. Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata,
Volume I: Continuous Responses (3rd ed.). College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Ríos-Figueroa, Julio. 2007.“Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective
Judiciary in Mexico, 1994–2002.” Latin American Politics and Society49:31–57.
Ríos-Figueroa, Julio, and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2014.“An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of
Judicial Independence.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, pp: 104–3
Rehm, P. 2009: “Risks and redistribution - an individual-level analysis.” Comparative Political
Studies 42(7): 855–881.
Salzman, Ryan, and Adam Ramsey. 2013. “Judging the Judiciary” Understanding Public
Confidence in Latin American Courts.” Latin American Politics and Society 55: 73-95.
Sanchez- Urribarri, Raul. 2008. “Characteristics of the Judiciary v. Corruption Perception.”
Sistemas Judiciales, a Journal of the Judicial Studies Center of the Americas 13: 88-99.
Segovia, Carolina. (2008). Political Trust in Latin America.

46

Seligson, Mitchell. 2002. “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: a Comparative
Study of Four Latin American Countries.” Journal of Politics 64: 408-33.
Seligson, Mitchell. 2005. “The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey
Evidence from Latin America.” World Development 34: 381-404.
Silva. Liliana. 2011. The Action of Guardianship in Colombia, 5 REVISTA IUS, 27, pp. 72-94.
Smith, Peter H. 2005. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative
Perspective. Oxford University Press.
Smithey, Shannon I. 2019. “Public Views of Courts: The views from Africa.” Presented to the
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association.
Snijders, T. A. B. and Bosker, R. J. 1994: “Modeled variance in two-level models.” Sociological
Methods & Research 22 (3): 342–363.
Snijders, T. A. B. and Bosker, R. J. 1999: Multilevel Analysis. An Introduction to Basic and
Advanced Multilevel Modeling. London: Sage.
Staats, Joseph. Shaun Bowler, and Jonathan Hiskey. 2005. “Measuring Judicial Performance in
Latin America.” Latin American Politics and Society. 47: 77-106.
Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon & Cem
Mert Dalli. 2021. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan21.
University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute,
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogstdjan21
Tyler, T. R. .2001. “Public trust and confidence in legal authorities: What do majority and
minority group members want from the law and legal institutions?” Behavioral Sciences
& the Law, 19(2), 215-235

47

Van- Craen, Maarten. 2012. “Determinants of Ethnic Minority Confidence in the Police.”
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, pp. 1029-1047
Wallace, Clifford J. 1998. “Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial
Independence.” California Western International Law Journal 29(2): 418-438.
Weyland, Kurt. 1998. The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. Journal of Democracy 9, 2:
108–21.
Wilson, Bruce M., 2011. “Enforcing Rights and Exercising an Accountability Function.” Courts
in Latin America, edited by Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-Figueroa, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 55–80.
Wilson, Bruce M., 2005.” Changing Dynamics: The Political Impact of Costa Rica’s
Constitutional Court.” The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, edited by Rachel
Seider, Line Schjolden, and Alan Angell, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 47-65.
Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22-43.
DATASET –
LAPOP
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/data-access.php
Quality of Governance
Teorell, Jan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon & Cem
Mert Dalli. 2021. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan21. University of
Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute,
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogstdjan21
Corruption Index
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl
World Data Bank
http://data.worldbank .org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-XQ-EG-SY-MA
48

IRSA?display =graph
Linzer and Staton Dataset
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/NFXWUO)
Varieties of Democracy
Coppedge, Michael, et al .2021. https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v111/

49

Appendix 1
Survey Questions
1. Confidence in the Judiciary:
To what extent do you have confidence that you can receive a fair trial? (1–7)
2. Questions related to (1) judicial independence and (2) impartial courts.
a. Judicial independence question asks, “Is the judiciary in your country independent
from political influences?”
b. The impartial courts question “The legal framework in your country for private
businesses to settle disputes and challenge the legality of government actions and/or
regulations is inefficient and subject to manipulation [scored 1] or is efficient and
follows a clear, neutral process [scored 7].”
3. Institutional Support:
To what point do you have respect for the political institutions of your country?
(0–6)
4. Democratic Support:
It may be that democracy has problems, but it is better than any other form of
government. To what extent do you agree with this statement? (0–6)
5. Rule of Law:
In order to capture delinquents, do you believe that authorities should always
respect the law? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
6. Education:
Count value in years of school completed (0–20)
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7. Experience in the Judiciary
In the last year, have you had contact with the courts? “Yes” responses were then
asked about corruption in the courts and given scores for responses. “No” responses
were presumably given a missing value. (Missing values = 0; scored values = 1)
8. Corruption in the Judiciary:
In the last year, have you had contact with the courts? If yes, did you have to pay
them a bribe? (Missing values = 0; no = 0;

yes = 1)

9. Perceived Corruption in General:
Having accounted for your experiences, or what you have heard, how generalizable
do you think corruption is among public officials? Very = 3, Somewhat = 2, Not very
= 1, Not generalizable = 0
10. Age:
Count value in years completed (16–97)
11. Gender:
Male = 1 Female = 0
12. Media exposure:
single 4-point item asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they hear news
about the courts through the mass media. The response categories included (1) never,
(2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) almost always, and (5) always.
13. Income:
Variables are personal and annual household income for both datasets and was
measured in terms of respondents’ annual household income. Respondents were asked
to indicate their household’s income per year (1 = less than 5,000, 2 = 5,000 to 10,000,
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3 = 10,001 to 15,000, and 4 = more than 15,000). These categories were later
combined to form a dichotomous measure with 0 = 10,000 or less (included initial
categories: 1 and 2) and 1 = More than 10,000 (included initial categories: 3 and 4).
Any respondent who earns 10, 000 or below, was considered a low-income earner.
14. Human Rights
To what extent would you say the current government protects human rights (1-7)
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